Showing posts with label Article 1370. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Article 1370. Show all posts

Monday, February 11, 2013

Kasilag vs Rodriguez (69 Phil 217)


FACTS

PROCEDURAL FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner (Kasilag) from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that the contract is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents (Rodriguez, et.al.), then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien.

SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having been acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for his part accepted the contract of mortgage.
Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands Petitioner, acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the Petitioner has no knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.

ISSUE
1.     Whether or not the principal contract entered into is null and void.
2.     Whether or not the subsequent contract is null and void.
3.     Whether or not the Kasilag is a possessor in good faith of the land.

HELD
1.     The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 (now Art. 1370) of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. The contract should be interpreted in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses. 
The words used by the contracting parties in the contract clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon. 
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties.
Principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not against the law.
2.     Parties entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he would assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874.

3.     Despite the foregoing, SC found the defendant-petitioner Kasilag as a possessor of the land in good faith. Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides “Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith.” And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent acquisition thereof.

Borromeo vs Court of Appeals (47 SCRA 65)


NATURE
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
Before 1933, defendant [Jose A. Villamor] was a distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller who was the agent of the Insular Lumber Company in Cebu City. Defendant being a friend and former classmate of plaintiff [Canuto O. Borromeo] used to borrow from the latter certain amounts from time to time. On one occasion, defendant borrowed from plaintiff a large sum of money for which he mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City to pay some pressing obligation with Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller filed a civil action against the defendant and attached his properties including those mortgaged to plaintiff, inasmuch as the deed of mortgage in favor of plaintiff could not be registered because not properly drawn up. Plaintiff then pressed the defendant for settlement of his obligation, but defendant instead offered to execute a document promising to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years. Liquidation was made and defendant was found to be indebted to plaintiff in the sum of P7,220.00, for which defendant signed a promissory note therefor on November 29, 1933 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, agreeing to pay as soon as I have money'. The note further stipulate that defendant 'hereby relinquish, renounce, or otherwise waive my rights to the prescriptions established by our Code of Civil Procedure for the collection or recovery of the above sum of P7,220.00. * * * at any time even after the lapse of ten years from the date of this instrument'.
After the execution of the document, plaintiff limited himself to verbally requesting defendant to settle his indebtedness from time to time. Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution of the document as there was no property registered in defendant's name, who furthermore assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the last war, plaintiff made various oral demands, but defendants failed to settle his account. CFI: Villamor ordered to pay Borromeo (represented by his heirs) the sum of P7,220.00 within ninety days from the date of the receipt of such decision with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the xpiration of such ninety-day period. CA: reversed CFI ruling

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the ruling of the CFI in finding the lack of validity of the stipulation amounting to a waiver in line with the principle "that a person cannot renounce future prescription"

HELD
YES! Between two possible interpretations, that which saves rather than destroys is to be preferred.
It is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the literal sense of the words employed is to be followed, such is not the case where they "appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties," which “intention shall prevail” (Art. 1370). The terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order (in this case the contested stipulation) should be separated from the valid and legal contract when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties.

Reasoning                                  
 There is nothing implausible in the view that such language renouncing the debtor's right to the prescription established by the Code of Civil Procedure should be given the meaning, as noted in the preceding sentence of the decision of respondent Court, that the debtor could be trusted to pay even after the termination of the ten-year prescriptive period. (so CA should have interpreted the stipulation based on the context of the friendship between the two parties)-'Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which, can be separated, or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract void. The first ten years after November 29, 1933 should not be counted in determining when the action of creditor, now represented by petitioners, could be filed. From the joint record on appeal, it is undoubted that the complaint was filed on January 7, 1953. If the first ten-year period was to be excluded, the creditor had until November 29, 1953 to start judicial proceedings. After deducting the first ten year period which expired on November 29, 1943, there was the additional period of still another ten years.29 Nor could there be any legal objection to the complaint by the creditor Borromeo of January 7, 1953 embodying not merely the fixing of the period within which the debtor Villamor was to pay but likewise the collection of the amount that until then was not paid.

Disposition
Wherefore, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of March 7, 1964 is reversed, thus giving full force and effect to the decision of the lower court of November 15, 1956. With costs against private respondents.